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High mobility explains demand sharing
and enforced cooperation in egalitarian
hunter-gatherers
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‘Simple’ hunter-gatherer populations adopt the social norm of ‘demand sharing’, an example
of human hyper-cooperation whereby food brought into camps is claimed and divided by
group members. Explaining how demand sharing evolved without punishment to free riders,
who rarely hunt but receive resources from active hunters, has been a long-standing problem.
Here we show through a simulation model that demand-sharing families that continuously
move between camps in response to their energy income are able to survive in unpredictable
environments typical of hunter-gatherers, while non-sharing families and sedentary families
perish. Our model also predicts that non-producers (free riders, pre-adults and post-pro-
ductive adults) can be sustained in relatively high numbers. As most of hominin pre-history
evolved in hunter-gatherer settings, demand sharing may be an ancestral manifestation of
hyper-cooperation and inequality aversion, allowing exploration of high-quality, hard-to-
acquire resources, the evolution of ﬂuid co-residence patterns and egalitarian resource
distribution in the absence of punishment or warfare.
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‘S
imple’ hunter-gatherers1 are found in Africa, Southeast
Asia and South America, predominantly egalitarian2,
monogamous, highly mobile, and lack resource storage
and wealth accumulation1, sharing food with related and
unrelated group members to an extent not observed in other
human populations or other species3. This is often explained by
‘demand sharing’4, the social norm by which individuals in
possession of highly coveted resources (such as meat) are forced
to share food with all other group members (including free-riding
individuals who rarely hunt). Meat butchering and distribution
are done as a rule by individuals other than the hunter, whose
family does not necessarily get a bigger share than other families5.
Together, such rules of sharing can be seen as a prior social
agreement establishing a cost to non-compliance6, with anecdotal
evidence from some hunter-gathering groups suggesting the
mocking and ridiculing of stingy individuals2. Food sharing is
crucial to hunter-gatherers who heavily rely on high-quality but
unpredictable and hard-to-acquire resources3. The dependence
on food transfers as a buffer to the uncertainty of food acquisition
and limitations to long-term storage imply a highly egalitarian
social organization and an absence of individual ownership of
resources (including game) in simple hunter-gatherer societies, in
contrast to more stratiﬁed agriculturalists, pastoralists and
‘complex’ hunter-gatherers1,2,4.
Demand sharing, by opposing the presence of non-sharers
(loners) and enforcing food sharing and collective resource
ownership, has been widely recognized as a fundamental
adaptation in simple hunter-gatherers2–5,7–12. However,
explaining how demand sharing can resist the spread of non-
hunters (free riders), who demand and receive food despite not
hunting (or hunting at low frequencies), remains a long-standing
problem. Moreover, such non-hunters have been observed in
many populations7,8 without prompting explicit forms of
punishment (such as exclusion from camps or from food
sharing). The free-rider problem faced by extant hunter-
gatherers resembles the ones addressed by economic games
such as the Public Goods Game13, N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma,
or Hawk-Dove Game14 among others, where pay-offs to general
cooperation (‘everybody hunts’) are higher than pay-offs to
general defection (‘nobody hunts’), but lower than pay-offs to free
riders living among co-operators (‘everybody hunts but me’)7,8.
However, current economic games do not reproduce the speciﬁc
social, ecological and life history characteristics that deﬁne the
hunter-gatherer lifestyle, such as enforced food sharing, an
intricate life cycle characterized by long growth and senescence
stages (which imply large numbers of low-producing individuals
in addition to free riders, such as pre-adults and older hunters)15,
and a niche characterized by high-quality but unpredictable and
hard-to-acquire resources16, which together tell apart human
hunter-gatherers from earlier hominins and closely related
African apes17,18.
Here we present an agent-based model that realistically
simulates hunter-gatherer populations living in an unpredictable
environment, and then compare the results with data from real
hunter-gatherers. Our results indicate that mobility is a key factor
in maintaining the cooperative system of demand sharing in
hunter-gatherers. We show that families that keep moving
between camps and practice demand sharing with other unrelated
families can prevent the spread of free riders in populations, and
therefore survive despite the unpredictability of hunting returns.
In contrast, both loner families (that do not share food) and
sedentary demand sharers fail to survive in similarly unpredict-
able environments. We argue that demand sharing may be an
important ancestral manifestation of hyper-cooperation in
humans, allowing hunter-gatherers, through a combination of
egalitarian resource distribution and high mobility, to explore
high-quality but hard-to-acquire resources, to evolve ﬂuid co-
residence patterns and to maintain high levels of cooperation in
the absence of punishment or warfare.
Results
Agent-based simulation of demand sharing. To investigate the
conditions that led to the evolution of demand sharing in
humans, we present an agent-based model with 15 parameters
incorporating key features of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle (see
Methods for full details). Each simulated agent represents the
combined features of all individuals constituting a monogamous,
nuclear family unit (adult male, female and dependent offspring)
rather than a single individual, so that its energy production
represents meat production by a male hunter (parameter k, or
value of a kill); energy consumption reﬂects the metabolic costs of
the male, female and all offspring (DCs, daily maintenance costs);
hunting implies an additional cost (HCs, hunting costs). The
survival curve of agents is modelled after empirical survival
curves derived from hunter-gatherer groups (a and b, age-speciﬁc
mortality coefﬁcients); agent fertility is modelled after female
fertility, reﬂecting reproductive constraints imposed on families
by monogamy (no reproduction before the age of 15 years and a
maximum of one offspring per year). Agents (the whole family
unit) die when their energy balance reaches zero and reproduce
only if the offspring survives to age 15 years (age, age at inde-
pendence), which depends on the parental agent maintaining
sufﬁcient energy levels during offspring development (RepT,
reproductive threshold). Storage is only possible in the form of
body fatness and has an upper limit corresponding to 30 days of
survival (f, maximum energy storage). Family units can move at a
cost (MCs, movement costs) around 20 possible locations (loca-
tion number), reﬂecting the high mobility of hunter-gatherers as
a response to the energy income obtained at a given location
(thresh, movement threshold). Propensity to hunt is heritable
(w, daily probability or propensity to hunt) but subject to random
mutation (m, mutation rate), with each agent being either an
active hunter (with propensity to hunt in the interval w¼ (0.75–
1.00)), or a free rider (wr0.1). On a day a hunter goes on a
hunting trip (with probability w), its daily probability of hunting
success will be the product of: age-dependent hunting ability
based on empirical curves of calorie production in male hunters10
(peak, age at peak hunting ability), number of hunters in the same
location to account for density effects on hunting productivity
(dens, density-dependent effects) and a varying probability of the
presence of game in a given camp (p, environmental quality). We
simulated the population dynamics of agents daily and over 1,500
years, following the algorithm presented in Fig. 1, and collected
demographic data at the end of simulations (see Methods for
deﬁnition of parameters, Supplementary Methods and
Supplementary Figs 1 to 16 for parameter range exploration,
and Supplementary Table 1 for intervals tested and used values).
Survival in harsh environments requires demand sharing. We
ﬁrst compared the long-term dynamics of simulated populations
under two conditions: agents required to share any produced food
with all camp members (demand sharing) and agents consuming
all they produced without sharing (loners). We compared survival
(time to collapse) of demand sharers and loners, both in separate
or the same simulations. We obtained similar results in both
scenarios (as expected, as loners neither give nor receive food
from other agents); however, as by deﬁnition demand sharing
prevents the presence of loners2,4, we present the results from
separate simulations. Results show that populations of demand
sharers were highly resilient and likely to avoid extinction over
1,500 simulated years, except under the harshest environmental
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conditions (when environmental quality p, or the daily
probability of the presence of game at a given location, was
set at a ﬁxed value of P¼ 0.5 or lower, or varying between
P¼ (0.2–1.00) or lower; Fig. 2 and Supplementary Figs 1 and 2).
In contrast, loners were able to survive only under more
favourable environmental conditions (ﬁxed PZ0.8, or variable
PZ(0.4–1.00)). Crucially, under values of environmental
quality between the two extremes above (that is, ﬁxed P¼ 0.6
and P¼ 0.7, or variable P¼ (0.3–1.00)), demand-sharing
populations typically survived to the end of simulations, while
loner populations quickly went extinct. Such intermediate values
of environmental quality p correspond to harsh conditions,
resulting in a rate of daily hunting success (the product of
environmental quality on that day, agent-speciﬁc hunting ability
and dens) of only 33% for each agent, closely matching the
average rate in real hunter-gatherers (28% for Hadza, 27%
for!Kung and 10–30% for Efe; Table 1). Enforced food sharing
therefore saves adults and their offspring from food shortage in
2 out of every 3 days. The results above demonstrate the
importance of the demand-sharing strategy to populations of
hunter-gatherers usually facing environments characterized by
high unpredictability.
Mobile hunter-gatherers avoid the spread of free riders. Next
we investigated the conditions under which the demand-sharing
strategy would be able to resist the challenge posed by the presence
of free riders (agents who still demand resources but have low
propensity to hunt). Our simulations investigated demographic
trends within demand-sharing populations, with free riders being
allowed to appear by mutation. Simulations show that when
demand-sharing agents are sedentary (meaning that they are not
allowed to move to new locations), free riders increase in number
within populations, active hunters decrease in number and
populations go extinct due to overall low productivity (Fig. 3).
However, an important result is that when both active hunters and
free riders are allowed to move from camps where net energy
income is low (either due to low environmental quality or to the
presence of a number of non-productive free riders), populations
do not collapse, active hunters remain a signiﬁcant fraction of the
demand-sharing populations and free riders make up a small but
persistent fraction of groups (time average of 10%; Supplementary
Fig. 17) in the absence of any form of direct punishment to free
riders (Fig. 3). Active hunters experience larger camp sizes and
move more frequently between camps than free riders
(Supplementary Figs 18 and 19), as only they incur HCs and
hence more often reach the low-energy-intake threshold that
triggers movement to other camps. In summary, free riders
accelerate the collapse of sedentary demand-sharing populations,
but do not prevent the survival of mobile demand-sharing
populations, irrespective of environmental quality (see Fig. 3 and
Supplementary Figs 1 and 2).
Simulated mobility rates match real hunter-gatherer data. As a
test for the model, we investigated the match between frequency
1. Agents go hunting with a probability w
2. Hunting outcome is determined
3. Hunters pay hunting costs (HC)
4. Agents share food equally with all group members at location
5. Agents pay costs of maintnance (DC)
6. Deaths due to extrinsic mortality and lack of energy
7. Reproduction, if energy balance over past 15 years are above threshold (RepT )
8. Migration, if average energy income under threshold over past 3 days (thresh)
Figure 1 | Diagram showing the main steps of the model simulation.
Diagram shown is for mobile demand-sharing populations. When agents
are loners step 4 is omitted, and when agents are sedentary step 8 is
omitted.
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Figure 2 | Time to collapse of simulated populations. Populations shown
are loners, demand sharing with free riders and demand sharers without
free riders. Environmental quality (p) was variable with p in (0.3–1). Mobile
populations of demand-sharing populations (with or without free riders)
survive for the 1,500 years of the simulation, whereas mobile loners quickly
collapse. Results shown are means and s.d. for ten replicates.
Table 1 | Movement, camp size and success rate per hunt in
simulated (demand sharing) and real hunter-gatherer
populations.
Population Days between
moves
Family units
per camp*
Success rate
per hunt
Simulated data
Active hunters 5.0±0.02 5.9±0.08 0.33±0.00
Free-riders 5.7±0.02 5.5±0.04
Real data
Punan 8.1 9.3
Semang 10.1 2.6
Aeta 16.6 4.6
Agta (North Luzon) 12.5 0.21
Ache (Guayaki) 6.3 5 0.50
Hiwi 9.1 0.24
Gwi 22.3 5.5
Dobe!Kung 63.4w 3.6 0.27
Hadza 13.5 10.4 0.27
Mbuti 30.6 12
Efe 30.4 0.3
Baka 22.8
Mean 20.5±15.8
(16.5±8.7 excluding
Dobe!Kung)
6.6±3.5 0.28±0.11
Simulated data (mean and s.d.) are based on a variable environment with environmental quality
p in the interval (0.3–1.0). Real data1,21–24 shown are mean number of days between moves
(calculated as 365/number of moves per year), experienced group size (number of families per
camp) and observed success rate per hunt.
Camp size includes both hunters and free riders; however, as they experience different camp
sizes (see main text), values are presented separately. In real hunter-gatherers, family units per
camp was estimated as mean group size/7 as in Marlowe25.
*Mean family units per camp was estimated in simulated populations as the mean number of
agents (in our simulations, nuclear families) per camp and over their complete lifespans.
wKelly21 reports that the low mobility of the desert Dobe!Kung in the Kalahari desert is limited by
water sources.
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of between-camp movement, population per camp and daily
probability of hunting success in simulated demand-sharing
populations and real hunter-gatherer populations (Table 1 and
Fig. 4). Predicted movement frequency (5.2 days between moves)
is at the higher end of the real hunter-gatherers range, but close to
the observed frequency in groups such as the Ache, Punan and
Hiwi (6.3, 8.1 and 9.1 days between moves, respectively). As we
proposed that high mobility is a condition for the maintenance of
demand-sharing populations, we investigated the values of days
between moves compatible with the survival of simulated popu-
lations. The results revealed a striking match to the observed
frequencies of movement in real hunter-gatherer groups (Fig. 4).
Our model predicts the survival of demand-sharing groups with
free riders when movement rates vary between 5 and 30 days
between moves, interval that includes 11 of the 12 demand-
sharing groups in Table 1. Together, the results show that the
combination of compulsory food sharing and movement trig-
gered by insufﬁcient energy income is a superior strategy both to
the mobile, non-sharing strategy of loners and to a sedentary,
sharing strategy, as it deals more efﬁciently with the effects of
unpredictability of food resources and signiﬁcantly reduces the
probability of population collapse by using mobility as a free-rider
avoidance mechanism.
Food transfers extend lifespans in simulated demand sharers.
Our simulation model reproduces the known fact that active
hunters produce a signiﬁcant lifetime surplus of energy (Fig. 5)
shared with low and non-producers. Low producers include non-
hunters (free riders), immature individuals undergoing extended
growth and development16, and older or ‘post-productive’
individuals (whose calorie production at older ages drops below
consumption levels). Owing to energy transfers from peak-
hunting individuals, simulated life expectancy at the age of
independence (15 years) is higher in demand-sharing groups than
among loners (Supplementary Table 2). Figure 5 also highlights
the decline in hunter productivity below maintenance levels at
around age 50 years. At that point, adults also become dependent
on food transfers. Accordingly, life expectancy at age 50 years in
the simulated demand-sharing population (9.1 years) was close to
that observed in the Agta (10.8 years), whereas in simulated
loners (3.3 years) values were more similar to observed life
expectancy in chimpanzees (4.5 years). As chimpanzees do not
depend on food sharing after weaning and are in this sense loners
(despite not hunting at high frequencies), our results suggest that
the evolution of demand sharing and generalized food
provisioning may have occurred early in the Homo lineage and
may have led to fundamental changes in human life history from
an ape-like to a hominin-like pattern, including an extended
period of pre-adult dependence and longer lifespans.
Discussion
By setting our model in the speciﬁc socio-ecological context of
hunter-gatherers, with the realistic requirements that resources
needed for survival are obtained from the environment, we have
shown that demand-sharing populations can resist collapse due to
the spread of free riders solely through free movement of family
units around camps, a solution that simultaneously solves the
problem of resource uncertainty10,11. Our simulations demon-
strate the compatibility of demand sharing with the continuous
spatial mobility of both active hunters and free riders. Other
proposals such as the ‘Walk Away’19 model have concluded that
spatial mobility accelerates the evolution of cooperation through
positive assortment of cooperators and resulting avoidance of free
riders, but this solution is associated with a drastic reduction in
mobility rates. Positive phenotypic assortment has also been
evoked to explain between-camp differences in levels of
cooperation in a Public Goods Game among Hadza hunter-
gatherers20, with highly cooperative Hadza individuals living
together in certain camps and thereby ‘excluding’ free riders. The
main problem with such proposals is that phenotypic assortment
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Figure 3 | Time to collapse of simulated populations of mobile versus
sedentary demand sharers. (a) Mobile demand sharers with free riders
and (b) sedentary demand sharers with free riders as a function of
environmental quality (p). Environmental quality (p) was simulated in two
different scenarios: with p in (0.3–1) and p¼ 1. Mobile demand-sharing
populations with free riders survive for the 1,500 years of the simulation,
whereas sedentary populations with free riders quickly collapse even when
environment is ‘ideal’ (p¼ 1). Results shown are means and s.d. for ten
replicates.
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Figure 4 | Distribution of mobility rates in simulated and real hunter-
gatherer populations. The graph shows time to collapse of simulated
demand-sharing populations with free riders as a function of mobility rate
(black circles with s.d. bars; left axis) and number of real hunter-gatherer
groups according to mobility rate (grey bars; right axis). We obtained a
series of populations differing in mobility rate (days between moves) by
varying the parameter thresh. Populations with mobility rates between
B5–30 days per move mostly survive to the end of simulations. Survival
decreases with higher or lower mobility rates. Histograms are based on the
12 demand-sharing hunter-gatherer groups listed in Table 1. Bars represent
ﬁve-unit intervals of days per move. Five to 10 days per move: Punan, Ache
and Hiwi. Ten to 15 days per move: Semang, Agta and Hadza. Fifteen to 20
days per move: Aeta. Twenty to 25 days per move: Gwi and Baka. Thirty to
35 days per move: Efe and Mbuti. The!Kung show extremely low mobility
rates (63.4 days between moves). As reported by Kelly21, the mobility of
the!Kung from the Kalahari Desert is restricted by access to wells.
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is not compatible with the observed high mobility and freedom of
movement of hunter-gatherers1,21–24. For this reason, they do not
show how positive phenotypic assortment could exclude free
riders (who are in principle as mobile as active hunters) from
‘cooperative’ camps, without explicit punishment. The ﬁnding of
the Walk Away model that high cooperation, here exempliﬁed by
demand sharing, would be associated with reduced between-
camp mobility, is also contradicted by evidence from hunter-
gatherer groups, who are highly mobile1 (Table 1). In contrast,
our model requires neither permanent assortment nor a
reduction of mobility once demand sharing is established. On
the contrary, it requires constant movement between camps and
predicts a collapse of demand-sharing populations when agents
are sedentary (Fig. 3). In fact, ethnographic studies have shown
that demand sharing does break apart when hunter-gatherer
populations are forced to settle3. Finally, the combination of high-
cooperation and mobility was derived in our simulations without
the postulation of any form of punishment or limitations on the
mobility of free riders, in agreement with the evidence from real
hunter-gatherer groups.
The main evolutionary implication of our model is that
demand sharing may have originated early in the hominin lineage
when large-game hunting became the major source of calories.
This transition would have depended on high mobility, both to
allow access to high-value but unpredictable and spatially sparse
meat sources17,18, and to allow active hunters to avoid camps
temporarily hosting free riders. This scenario explains the
maintenance and viability of enforced food sharing among
unrelated individuals without the need for explicit mechanisms of
reciprocity and ﬁrst- and second-order punishment of non-
hunting free riders25,26. Although the evolution of more
sophisticated punishment mechanisms may have been
facilitated once the simpler avoidance-by-movement mechanism
was established, our model suggests that they were not necessary
for the origin of demand-sharing groups. An important
implication for human life history is that the predicted
reduction of later life mortality as a result of demand sharing
may also have led to larger cohorts of individuals surviving to
older ages, and thus provided the selective context for the
evolution of grandmothering27. Furthermore, the movement of
nuclear families as a whole between camps is compatible with the
evolution of bisexual philopatry (or dispersal of both sexes)
characteristic of humans, in contrast to the patrilocal and
matrilocal residence patterns of apes28. Finally, our proposed
scenario for the evolution and maintenance of the hunter-
gatherer lifestyle does not require intergroup competition and
cultural group selection29 as conditions for intragroup
cooperation. Our proposal is therefore compatible with low
levels of warfare among African hunter-gatherers30 and derives
cooperative behaviour, egalitarianism and non-kin extended
social networks20 from selective pressures at the individual
level31.
Methods
Model design. We investigated the origin and consequences of demand sharing
through an agent-based model incorporating key features of the hunter-gatherer
lifestyle: hunting, moving, sharing, reproducing and ageing. We use a walk-away
(or win-stay/lose-shift) rule to determine agent movement19,32,33. Each simulated
agent represents the combined features of all individuals constituting a
monogamous, nuclear family unit (adult male, female and dependent offspring), so
that its energy production represents meat production by a male hunter. Energy
consumption reﬂects metabolic costs of male, female and dependent offspring.
Hunting and moving to other locations also involve costs. At age 15 years,
surviving offspring become independent agents34,35.
We simulated the existence of different agent strategies: loners (agents that
actively hunt but do not share resources outside the nuclear family) and demand
sharers (agents that are forced to share any food obtained by hunting with other
agents present in the same camp or location). Demand-sharing populations were
simulated in three different ways: only mobile active hunters, mobile active hunters
and free riders (who have low propensity to hunt but nonetheless share resources
brought to the camp by active hunters), and sedentary populations of active
hunters and free riders.
Food is modelled as a high-quality and unpredictable resource, such as meat
from game, returned after hunting. Each agent has a level of energy increased by
feeding and reduced by MCs, HCs and DCs. Agents can store a maximum number
of units of energy as body fat corresponding to 30 days of maintenance costs or
ability to survive without food if they are not hunting or moving. Agents die if their
energy falls below 0 units. We also added background daily mortality probability
(as in real human populations, increasing after independence). Agent longevity
represents either adult male or female survival as we assume no signiﬁcant
dimorphism in adult survival.
Agent reproduction reﬂects fertility patterns in a monogamous population (no
reproduction before the age of 15 years, maximum of one offspring per year).
Reproduction is recorded only if offspring survives to age 15 years (which depends
on energy levels maintained during offspring development). Offspring inherit the
same hunting phenotype as their family unit. In some simulations, free riders (non-
hunters) are introduced through a mutation in hunting propensity.
Agents can move throughout a landscape with 20 possible locations
(representing camps). Agents move to randomly selected locations independently
of anyone else leaving. Agents move in response to their net energy income over
the last 3 days at their current location, moving if its mean value drops below a
threshold. In simulations where agents do not share with other agents (loners),
each agent’s energy balance is increased by the daily amount of energy that they
produced. In simulations where agents share, successful hunters at a location
equally distribute pooled resources among all agents in that location (irrespective of
whether an agent hunted or was successful in a hunt). Only individuals who hunted
incur the energy cost of hunting (irrespective of success).
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Figure 5 | Energy production and consumption in simulated and real
hunter-gatherers. (a) Age-speciﬁc daily energy production (solid lines) and
consumption (dashed lines) from age 15 years in simulated demand-sharing
agents. (b) Real data for human hunter-gatherers (real production and
consumption curves adapted from ref. 16, is a mean from Ache, Hadza and
Hiwi male production).
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Hunting ability of real hunter-gatherers changes with age due to the high level
of skill, knowledge and strength required to hunt5. Studies have reported an initial
learning period during which production is low, and age-related senescence causes
a reduction in productivity16,36. To reﬂect this, we model the probability that an
agent successfully hunts as a function of age-dependent ability, peaking at age 35
years16, the location-based probability of ﬁnding game and the number of other
hunters in that location.
Simulations. Simulations start with 100 agents, with an age structure roughly
similar to that of a traditional society37. Initial energy is distributed between 50%
and 70% of the maximum energy storage limit. All agents who are old enough are
assumed to be at least 365 days past their last reproduction (so that this does not
restrict initial reproduction). Any agent in the initial population is removed from
the analysis. Agents are distributed among half of the possible locations but are free
to move, except in sedentary populations where they are randomly distributed
among all possible locations. Simulations are run to model life on a daily basis for
1,500 years. For each parameter combination, ten independent replicates are run.
Owing to density-dependence effects, populations rarely reached 250 individuals.
Simulations were run using Matlab R2012a38. Figures were produced in R39
using the packages lattice40, ggplot2 (ref. 41), gridExtra42, plyr43 and reshape44.
Model parameters. Deﬁnitions and range of tested values of each of the 15 model
parameters and parameter explorations are presented in Supplementary Table 1,
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Figs 1 to 16. Criteria for selection of
parameter values (parametrization) were based on our aim of simulating a hunter-
gatherer lifestyle and are discussed below.
Environmental quality (p) is a measure of daily probability of presence of game
at a given location. p was set as either ﬁxed or variable depending on the scenario.
Variable scenarios allow us to test the effect of unpredictability of environments. In
the variable scenarios, p in each location changed every 5 days, with a new value
being chosen independently at each location and randomly from a uniform
distribution. We ran simulations exploring a range of ﬁxed and variable values of
environmental quality (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Figs 1 and 2)
and evaluated their effect on the survival of the four types of populations (loners,
mobile demand sharers with free riders, mobile demand sharers without free riders
and sedentary demand sharers).
Active hunters in demand-sharing populations have a daily propensity to hunt
w ﬁxed throughout their lifetime and drawn from a uniform distribution between
w¼ 0.75 and w¼ 1 at the age of independence. Free riding are introduced through
a mutation in hunting propensity, with their w chosen from a uniform distribution
between w¼ 0 and w¼ 0.1 at the time of independence. Free riders are therefore
demand sharers (that is, they participate in the sharing pools) with low propensity
to hunt. We used the discrete intervals of w described above to force the
introduction of a free rider every time a mutation occurred.
Agents who are active hunters produce offspring who are active hunters, except
if a mutation takes place; free riders produce offspring who are free riders.
Mutation rate in hunting propensity was set at m¼ 0 (scenarios without free
riders) or m¼ 0.005 (scenarios with free riders). Explorations of parameter m are
shown in Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Figs 3 and 4.
The curve of age-speciﬁc hunting ability was deﬁned as huntab¼ 0.9 exp
( (age peak) 365))2/(2 7,3002)), with age in days, and produces a peak
value of 0.9 in hunting ability at age 35 years to match empirical evidence16,36.
The hunting ability function was based on production curves for real hunter-
gatherers16. However, we have varied the age of peak production to explore the
effect of this parameter in the model (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary
Figs 5 and 6).
Density-dependence of hunting success (dens) was introduced as a factor
(dens)N 1, where N is the number of hunters at a given location. In the main
simulations, density dependence was estimated as (0.9)N 1. This produces values
of daily probability of hunting success very close to what is observed in hunter-
gatherers (Table 1). Exploration of the parameter dens is shown in Supplementary
Methods and Supplementary Fig. 7.
To simulate the age-related increase in mortality observed in humans, we used a
two-parameter background daily mortality probability given by 1 exp( (a/b)
(exp(b (ageþ 1)) exp(b (age 1)))), where age is in days, a¼ 2.7 10 7
and b¼ 2.4 10 4. Parameters a and b were chosen so as to maximize match to
published mortality curves for hunter-gatherers45. The chosen parameter values
produce, for example, a yearly mortality rate close to 0 from age 15 to 16 years, and
around 0.37 from age 70 to 71 years, independently of any energy-based
considerations. Total mortality rate is background mortality multiplied by energy-
dependent mortality (which can be considerably higher).
Our simulations assume a number of 20 locations (location number). Each
location may or may not be occupied at any given time. One of us (A.B.M.) has
studied a population of 800 Agta hunter-gatherers spread around 20 camps, or an
average of 40 individuals per camp. Based on Marlowe22, this corresponds to about
seven family units per camp. Explorations of the parameter dens are shown in
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 8.
Demand sharing is mostly commonly observed in the case of large game. We
therefore modelled big game hunting and the energy value of a kill k on the size of
large deer, which are frequently hunted by all hunter-gatherers in Africa, Southeast
Asia and America. However, k may also be seen as the value of all kills (large or
small game) resulting from a hunting trip. Based on data on caloric consumption
by family units, and on deer size and caloric value, we derived a value of k¼ 4, or
eight times daily caloric needs of a family unit. Hawkes et al.46 report that Hadza
hunters brought to camp a total live weight of 10,115 kg from 71 large animals, or
an average of B140 kg per carcass. About 40 kg of consumable meat can be
extracted from a carcass of that size and 1 kg of meat has a caloric value of
B1,500 kcal16, or a total of B60,000 kcal per deer or total acquired prey. On the
other hand, the total consumption per agent or family is about 7,500 kcal (0.5
energy unit). This implies that one large deer could provide energy for
approximately eight family units. For this reason, we had k¼ 4 units from a single
carcass and DCs¼ 0.5 unit in the model. However, we also varied the parameter
(see Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 9 for parameter exploration).
Each agent has a level of energy, which is increased by feeding and reduced by
DCs, HCs and MCs. Our agents represent family units and hence maintenance
costs should reﬂect two adults and dependent offspring of all ages. We adopted a
simplifying assumption of a ﬁxed DC of 0.5 units (roughly 7,500 kcal per day) to
reﬂect a lifetime average and a constant turnover of offspring growing up to
independence while others are born. The daily value of 7,500 kcal per family units
is not far off real estimates16. Explorations of the parameter DCs are shown in
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 10.
HCs include costs of hunting, transporting and processing the kill. We chose a
ﬂat value of 0.4 units (or B6,000 kcal). Explorations of the parameter HC are
shown in Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 11.
In a real setting, MCs of the agent (that is, the whole family unit) vary
depending on distance between old and new location. In our model, we assume a
constant cost of 0.3 units, corresponding toB4,500 kcal. However, we have tested a
range of parameter values (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 12).
Agents can store up to a maximum of energy storage (f)¼ 15 units of energy in
the form of body fat reserves in the whole family unit. This cumulative energy
balance is continuously updated as a function of daily net energy income. The value
of f¼ 15 corresponds to 30 days of survival without eating, roughly corresponding
to reports based on hunger strikers47. Beyond 30 days, survival should therefore
depend on forms of storage other than body fat (such as food storage, which is not
observed in simple hunter-gatherers1). Explorations of the parameter f are shown
in Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 13.
Agents move to another random location whenever the amount of food they
obtain in a given location is not sufﬁcient. This is achieved by equipping agents
with a 3-day memory of their net energy income (a balance of energy income from
hunting and sharing on the one hand and costs of hunting and maintenance on the
other) at the current location, which triggers movement from a location if its mean
value drops below a threshold. It should be emphasised that although movement is
triggered by this 3-day net income balance (and the thresh value, death of an agent
is determined by its overall (cumulative) energy balance. Measures of 3-day energy
income are not limited by storage upper limits (that is, an agent with energy level
near f can count all energy income regardless of whether it would take its stored
energy above f) to better reﬂect the quality of the environment. Agents must have
been in their location for at least 2 days before they are allowed to move again to
experience the new environment. Explorations of the parameter thresh are shown
in Fig. 4, Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 14.
In Supplementary Fig. 15, we show the results for varying age at independence
(age), or the age at which offspring become independent agents (that is, when they
establish new family units). In our main simulations, age at independence was set
at 15 years. It should be noticed that age 15 in our simulations is a minimum age
for start of reproduction and not average age of ﬁrst reproduction (average age of
reproduction would be later, as it depends on having a high-enough energy
balance, and on average our agents at age 15 years are still highly reliant on food
transfer, consuming more energy than they are able to produce), see Fig. 5.
Reproduction can begin when agents become independent (at age 15 years).
To reﬂect the costs of bringing up offspring over their dependent period, we
established the conditions that reproduction is only possible if an agent has
sufﬁcient energy in the present (13.5 units, or 90% of the maximum storage level
given by f¼ 15 units), had sufﬁcient energy over the last 15 years (also an average
of 13.5 units) and has not reproduced within the last 365 days (to deﬁne an inter-
birth interval reﬂecting human pregnancy length). There is also a random factor
associated with reproduction to reduce the probability that two agents will
reproduce on the same day. In our main simulations we used a RepT value set at
RepT¼ 13.5 energy units. The value represents 90% of the total storage capacity of
the agent (f¼ 15). This indicates that the amount of body fat necessary for
reproduction would have to be kept high, reﬂecting the expensive offspring
produced by our species. Explorations of the parameter RepT are shown in
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 16.
Comparisons between simulations and real hunter-gatherers data. We
recorded data in our main simulations to compare with published data from
hunter-gatherers. Several measures were taken on death for each individual in the
model and a mean value calculated across all individuals within a replicate
population. These are number of offspring, mean group size experienced, number
of moves (used to calculate mean number of days between moves) and age at death
(used to calculate age-speciﬁc life expectancy). Results on frequency of mobility,
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camp size and rates of hunting success for the simulation are reported in Table 1, in
comparison with real hunter-gatherers.
Daily probability of hunting success is a product of three factors: the probability
of ﬁnding food in a locality (quality of environment, p), age-speciﬁc hunting ability
and the presence of other hunters. If we assume peak hunting ability (in our model,
a probability of 90% of making a kill if game is present in the locality at age 35
years) and no competition from other hunters, predicted hunting success of a peak
producer is 0.9 times 0.65 (the average environmental quality in the variable
environment, where p varies between 0.3 and 1), orB58%. This value matches real
data (Table 1).
To calculate energy income and production, data were taken from a population
census on 1 day every year for the duration of the simulation (Fig. 5). The age and
hunting success and whether an individual hunted on that day were recorded,
pooled and averaged across age categories (ageo20 years, and then in decades up
to the oldest living individual). Net income was plotted, having subtracted any
HCs. Consumption data are measures of how much energy is available to the
individuals each day, regardless of whether it is used or stored. Simulated data from
ﬁve replicate populations are combined. Parameters used were as given above and
an environment with a ﬁxed probability of ﬁnding game to hunt (environmental
quality) of p¼ 0.75.
Age-speciﬁc life expectancy for simulated populations of (i) demand sharers
with free riders and (ii) loners were calculated from one representative replicate for
each (Supplementary Table 1). Agents were censused on death, with each dead
agent’s age recorded, and data were then grouped by age into decades. In simulated
populations, life expectancy is calculated only for agents that survive to age at
independence. Environmental quality was ﬁxed at p¼ 0.75.
To calculate age-speciﬁc life expectancy, the number of individuals dying within
an age decade was divided by the number living to be that age and older to give
mortality qx. Age-speciﬁc survival (lx) was calculated as the product of (1 qx) for
each x up to that age. Finally, the age speciﬁc life-expectancy (ex) was calculated as
ex ¼ 0:5þð1lx
P1
i¼ xþ 1 liÞ, where the inﬁnite sum was taken over all remaining ages
recorded (that is, to the oldest individual).
Real data are from Blurton-Jones48 for the Hadza and calculated data are from
from Headland et al.49 for the Agta. Male and female data and combined data were
calculated from Hill and Hurtado50 for the Ache and synthetic male and female
data and combined data were calculated from Hill et al.51
For the Agta, female and male life-tables contain only individuals of those sexes,
whereas the combined life-tables include all individuals, irrespective of whether
gender was speciﬁed. The results show that demand sharing increases life
expectancy in comparison with loners, and that loners and chimpanzees show
relatively similar life expectancies.
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